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EDITORIAL NOTE

Torpey’s analysis of ESG ratings (ratings for environmental
stewardship, social responsibility, and corporate
governance) and their systematic variation between highly
regulated and less regulated industries opens up several
fascinating unexplored aspects about the construction
and use for ESG ratings to EMR readers. First, it shows
that regulation matters—companies in highly regulated
industries show systematically higher ESG ratings than
those in less regulated industries. Ergo higher ratings
are less of an outcome of intentional social responsibility
effort by corporate management, but rather a response
to stakeholder pressure (regulators), which, if not
addressed, leads to poorer performance in the industry
and lower shareholder value. In less regulated industries
such effects are not that visible and higher ESG ratings
show more the strategic intent of the leaders to at least
signal, if not execute, business logic that caters to ESG
requirements. A second interesting aspect raised by the
analysis is, does the level of regulation match with the
need for higher ESG concerns, and hence ESG measures
the general expected impact of respective firms on ESG
areas? Clearly, highly regulated industries—utilities and
financial sectors—have reasons to be regulated, because
of their infrastructural nature (both), environmental
impact (utilities), and the threat of fraud and moral hazard
(financial sector). But, aren’t information technology
(environmental impact, monopolistic behaviors, work
environment effects in manufacturing) or consumer
discretionary sector (environmental effects, work
environments in manufacturing) equally gullible for
demands for higher ESG ratings? This suggests that
‘inherited’ institutional environment and its pressure are
more likely to affect ESG ratings than other factors (such
as regulatory need). Probably, ESG is mostly a proxy of the
level of institutional pressure towards that industry sector
on selected ESG areas.
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ABSTRACT
Firm performance in the specific areas of environmental stewardship,
social responsibility, and corporate governance (ESG) has become an
important criterion that investors use in determining a firm’s value.
This empirical investigation, based on stakeholder theory examines
the relationship between regulatory oversight and third-party ESG
ratings. Our research methodology involved quantitative, observational, and retrospective analyses. The study population consisted of
471 firms from two heavily regulated industry sectors—the utility and
financial sectors—and from two less regulated sectors—the information technology and consumer discretionary sectors. We compiled
the ESG ratings for the firms from two independent rating services.
The quantitative evaluation included multiple regression analysis and
multiway frequency analysis. The findings show a statistically significant difference for firms in heavily regulated sectors compared to the
ratings for firms in less regulated sectors for the environmental and
governance component ratings. This study provides information to
help stakeholders recognize the influence of regulation on ESG ratings and explains to investors and company leaders why ESG ratings
vary among different industry sectors. This study was limited to four
specific sectors but may provide insights applicable to other sectors
based on regulatory intensity.
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SYNOPSIS
Purpose

Results

Practical Relevance

This study examines the relationship between regulatory oversight and third-party ratings for environmental stewardship,
social responsibility, and corporate governance (ESG). Because ESG ratings serve
to increase firm attractiveness, factors affecting ESG ratings should be considered
when evaluating and comparing firms. The
body of research linking ESG performance
to various mediating factors continues
to grow. As a mediating factor, regulatory oversight has not yet been deeply
explored; our study thus adds another dimension to the ESG literature.

We analyzed ESG ratings in two heavily
regulated industry sectors and two less
regulated sectors: the utility and financial
sectors for the former and information
technology and consumer discretionary
sectors for the latter. The study results
indicate the absence of a statistically significant relationship between the level of
regulation and the total ESG rating. However, our analysis of separate, individual
components of the ESG rating shows that
both the environmental rating and the
governance rating exhibit a statistically
significant relationship to the level of regulation. For the social responsibility rating,
results were mixed. We found a statistically significant but negatively correlated
relationship to the level of regulation using the data from one ESG rating service;
however, we found that no statistically
significant relationship was present with
data from a second source.

Company executives in heavily regulated
sectors, such as the utility and financial
sectors, recognize that their firm must
meet regulatory requirements and that
compliance is expected; otherwise, they
will fall behind their competitors and
peers in the eyes of their stakeholders.
The utility sector is transitioning to more
sustainable ways to produce energy. The
financial sector received increased scrutiny and a tainted reputation because of the
sub-prime mortgage crisis, but now is experiencing stellar stock performance. That
firms in these heavily regulated sectors
receive higher environmental and governance ratings is not surprising; they are
required to comply with demands placed
on them by stakeholders and regulators.
Nevertheless, stakeholders cannot expect
regulated companies to be any more philanthropic, worker-oriented, or socially accountable than any other company; in fact,
they may be less so. They can expect regulated companies to perform better where
regulation requires such performance.
Meanwhile, firms in unregulated sectors
may want to study how firms in regulated
sectors have overcome their tarnished images to emerge as better performers in relation to ESG ratings. Stakeholders should
recognize that less-regulated companies
with high ESG ratings are more socially responsible by choice, not because they are
required to be by regulation.

Problem of Practice
Firms in heavily regulated industry sectors
are under pressure from both investors
and other stakeholders to increase their
ESG ratings. A firm’s ESG rating may be affected by the level of regulatory oversight
in its sector. Because ESG ratings serve to
increase firm attractiveness for investors,
they should consider mediating factors
that affect ESG ratings when evaluating
and comparing firm performance. Companies appear to recognize the benefits
of having favorable ESG ratings; however, external factors might cause certain
sectors to receive higher or lower ratings
than others. Weaknesses in the ESG rating
system are evident in circumstances like
the bankruptcy filing by PG&E Corporation, the Volkswagen emissions scandal,
and the BP Deepwater Horizon incident.
All companies were highly rated by environmentally focused investors. The three
incidents are high-profile examples of ESG
rating failures and justify taking a closer
look at whether there are systemic issues
with ESG ratings.

21

Engaged Management ReView

Conclusions
This study examined the relationship between regulation and ESG performance
ratings in four industry sectors. The
purpose of the study was to determine
whether being in a heavily regulated industry sector plays any role in the ESG
ratings a firm receives. Investors increasingly are turning to ESG ratings to assess a
firm’s commitment to sustainability. High
ESG ratings reduce the perception of firm
risk related to environmental, social, and
governance issues, leading to increased
interest in factors that influence these
ratings. The findings of this study indicate
that regulation has a statistically significant positive relationship to environmental and governance ratings, a negative or
neutral relationship to social ratings, and
no relationship to total, or aggregated,
ESG ratings. The results of this study may
be beneficial in explaining to investors and
company leaders why ESG ratings vary
among different industry sectors.
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METHODOLOGY
Research Question

Method and Design

What is the relationship between a firm’s
ESG rating and the level of regulation in
the firm’s industry sector? In addressing
this question, we hypothesize the following:

This research was quantitative, observational (non-experimental), and retrospective, using data from third-party sources.
Two assessments were performed to account for differences in how ESG ratings
are reported by the ESG rating firms:
continuous assessment and categorical
assessment. We conducted multiple regression analysis (MRA) using numeric
(continuous) ESG ratings from Sustainalytics as the dependent variables, regulation as the independent variable, and
institutional ownership, total three-year
return on assets (ROA), and market capitalization as mediating variables (Figure
1). A multiway frequency analysis (MFA)

	Firms in heavily regulated sectors have
ESG ratings that are not statistically
significantly different from firms in less
regulated sectors.
We test this hypothesis using the total
ESG rating and using each of the three
components: environmental, social, and
governance.

was conducted using categorical ESG ratings from MSCI (Figure 2).
Data Collection, Sample, and Analysis
The study population consists of 471
publicly traded companies, each having a
market capitalization of at least $3.9 billion. The 471 firms were from four industry sectors: 201 firms operate in heavily
regulated sectors (financial and utilities),
and 270 firms operate in less regulated
sectors (information technology and consumer discretionary). Companies in the
consumer discretionary sector sell nonessential goods and services such as vehicles and appliances.

Figure 1. Multiple Regression Model Using Sustainalytics ESG Data
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Figure 2. Multiway Frequency Analysis Using MSCI Categorical ESG Ratings

PRACTICAL PROBLEM
ESG ratings serve to increase firm attractiveness. Thus, factors affecting ESG
ratings should be considered when evaluating and comparing firms. The level of
regulatory oversight is a factor that may
affect a firm’s ESG ratings. The literature
reviewed for this study generally found
that companies appear to recognize the
benefits of having favorable ESG ratings;
however, external factors potentially
cause certain sectors to receive higher or
lower ratings than others.
Regulation is not a panacea for better ESG
performance, as evidenced in the bankruptcy filing by PG&E Corporation, the
Volkswagen emissions scandal, and the
BP Deepwater Horizon incident. Each of
these companies was highly rated by environmentally focused investors and subject to varying degrees of environmental
and governance regulation. The devastating Camp Fire in California has been tied
to PG&E’s transmission system maintenance issues. Volkswagen was ordered
to pay a $2.8 billion criminal fine for rigging diesel-powered vehicles to cheat on
government emissions tests, and the BP
Deepwater Horizon incident in 2010 was
like another BP incident in the Caspian Sea
in 2008. Although leadership and cultural
issues beyond the scope of the present
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analysis likely contributed to these corporate calamities, these three high-profile
examples reveal that ESG ratings do not
always align with ESG performance and
potentially suggest systemic biases with
ESG ratings.
Regarding the Volkswagen incident, even
after the emissions scandal, VW continued
to have ESG ratings higher than its peers.
The American Council for Capital Formation commented how this example “shows
a complete failure by the ratings agencies
to accurately capture ESG risk, even after
a blatant attempt at bypassing environmental regulations.” The report was critical
of rating agencies’ ability to identify risks
and mismanagement (El-Hage, 2021).
Firms in heavily regulated sectors are expected to satisfy environmental and governance standards imposed by regulators.
Firms have few regulatory incentives to
implement social initiatives. This study
identifies whether a significant statistical
difference arises in ESG component and
aggregate ratings between firms in highly regulated sectors versus firms in less
regulated sectors. A relationship between
ESG ratings and regulation inform investor expectations regarding ESG ratings for
firms they are evaluating.

LITERATURE REVIEW
This literature review examines theories of
corporate social responsibility with particular emphasis on stakeholder theory. This
is followed by a summary of the literature
addressing regulatory oversight, ESG in
regulated sectors, this studies’ variables,
and gaps in the literature.
Corporate Social Responsibility Theories
and Categories
Underpinning ESG performance is corporate social responsibility (CSR). CSR has
been the subject of numerous research
papers using a variety of theoretical perspectives. These theories may be divided
into two categories: theories of external
drivers and theories of internal drivers.
Theories of external drivers include views
that are relational, political, or integrative
and are concerned with the nature of a
firm’s relationships with the environment.
This includes stakeholder theory, as well
as institutional theory, legitimacy theory, and resource dependency theory, all
of which are useful in examining external
drivers and mediators of social responsibility (Frynas & Yamahaki, 2016). Internal
drivers, such as resource-based view and
agency theory, focus on evaluating internal organizational mechanisms to take
on social and environmental concerns.
Internal drivers apply when evaluating
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firm management and the social values of
individuals inside organizations. Of all the
internal and external theories, stakeholder
theory is the most widely used, followed
by institutional theory and legitimacy theory (Frynas &Yamahaki, 2016).
Stakeholder theory has been used in researching how corporate social performance relates to financial performance.
The trade-off in allocating resources to
social initiatives may be lower profits or
earnings, which is counter to profit maximization goals (Ting et al., 2020). Some
stakeholder theory proponents suggest
that firms should maximize value for
all stakeholders, not just shareholders.
Economist Milton Friedman famously disagreed and saw limited financial benefit
accruing to CSR activity (Vural, 2020).
The Stakeholder Perspective
Stakeholder theory predicts that a firm’s
environmental and socially responsible
activities will be value-enhancing for its
stakeholders. In times of policy-related uncertainty, such as before a general
election, firms increase their overall ESG
activities to shield themselves from potential ESG-related disasters, such as a
major product recall. These actions benefit
all the stakeholders who want to see the
company survive (Vural, 2020).
Identifying all ESG risks and recognizing
the concerns of a broad range of stakeholders, including customers, suppliers,
and the community, can help leaders to
achieve a sustainable business. Boards
must practice stakeholder governance to
understand stakeholder concerns. They
also must guard against allowing shortterm issues (e.g., high gas prices) to drive
company strategy (Diller, Betts, Corte, Silk,
& Simpson, 2021).
To some extent, CSR initiatives pertain
to the expectations of the various entities and actors in a firm’s social systems.
From this perspective, firm leaders must
acknowledge that the firm exists not just
in a world of shareholders, but within larger assemblages of financial, political, and

24

Engaged Management ReView

social actors. These stakeholders each
place demands on the firm. In this stakeholder perspective, the firm is a collection
of intersecting and competing interests,
each with some value. The firm becomes
a place of facilitation, where the competing interests of different stakeholders in a
broader society can interact (Maon et al.,
2010).
Regulatory Oversight
Economic regulation sets various constraints on firm actions and decisions
(Cambini et al., 2015). Regulations may
incentivize investment and efficiency and
may constrain management discretion.
Regulatory bodies see the value offered
by socially responsible firms. Socially responsible firms are less likely to be under
SEC investigation because of violations in
generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP); the implication is that these firms
have greater transparency and integrity in
their business practices than their less socially responsible peers (Lee et al., 2018).
Regulation functions as a constraint on
firms’ activities, which changes the incentives normally found in market-based
mechanisms (Cambini et al., 2015). Financial institutions (e.g., banks and savings
institutions) and utility companies are still
considered heavily regulated, although
they have both experienced some deregulation recently (Becher & Frye, 2011, p.
740). Earlier studies see similarities in
governance mechanisms for these two
industries, in addition to both industries
facing a higher level of regulatory control
(Becher & Frye, 2011). The utility model is
a monopoly model, where utilities operate in exclusive franchise territories, unlike firms in other sectors (Starkweather,
2017). In many states in the U.S. the public
utility sector operates in noncompetitive
markets, strongly influenced by regulatory constraints on firm behavior and decisions. Regulators set utility rates during
contested hearings, weighing input from
utility stakeholders on the prudency of
utility spending and capital investments.

ESG Ratings for Heavily Regulated
Sectors
Firms in heavily regulated sectors are under pressure to increase their ESG ratings.
Regulators may apply pressure on firms
to use effective corporate governance
structures. The mere presence of regulators has been found to affect governance
practices in firms, even without specific
mandates (Becher & Frye, 2011).
The relationship between ESG performance and banks’ shareholder value
creation is complex. Research has found
a negative and significant correlation of
banks’ social performance with shareholder value creation, a positive and significant
relationship of banks’ environmental performance with shareholder value creation,
and a positive and significant relationship
of banks’ corporate governance performance with shareholder value creation
(Miralles-Quirós et al., 2019).
Meanwhile, electric utilities often take on
socially responsible initiatives because
they result in cost savings or other positive financial results, rather than simply
for image building (Miras-Rodríguez et al.,
2015). However, environmentally friendly
behaviors in electrical companies also are
driven by the need to improve their image
and to reverse the companies’ earlier negative environmental impact (Miras-Rodríguez et al., 2015). Energy companies
increasingly are being forced to become
more socially responsible, especially
around environmental performance, because their historically high production of
emissions have been associated with acid
rain, poor air quality, and climate change
(Kludacz-Alessandri, 2020).
A regulated environment does not necessarily drive higher ESG ratings than a less
regulated, highly competitive environment. Highly competitive firms recognize
the value of ESG activities. Meanwhile,
firms in concentrated industries, such as
utilities, may not have the same competition-driven discipline found in other sectors and therefore may not prioritize ESG
activities (Vural, 2020).
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Components of ESG Ratings
Aouadi and Marsat (2018) define the three
components of ESG ratings:
• The environmental measure consists of
three categories: emission reduction,
product innovation, and resource reduction or energy conservation. Highly
rated companies include Citigroup and
Exelon. Lower rated companies include
Atmos Energy and E*Trade Financial
Corporation.
• The governance measure has five
categories: board functions, board
structure, compensation policy, shareholders policy, and vision and strategy.
CenterPoint Energy, Inc. and Reinsurance Group of America, Inc. are highly
rated for governance, whereas Goldman Sachs is lower rated.
• The social measure considers community, diversity, employment quality, health and safety, human rights,
product responsibility, and training and
development. NextEra and DTE Energy have high social ratings. Berkshire
Hathaway and FNF Group have lower
social ratings than their peers.
The total ESG score is an aggregation of
the component scores.
Mediating Variables: Institutional
Ownership, ROA, and Market
Capitalization.
Institutional ownership is the percentage
of shares held by institutional investors.
Current research shows a positive and significant association between future corporate social performance and the holdings
of long-term institutional owners. Executives generally prioritize the demands of
their larger and more vocal stakeholders,
and institutional investors generally have
more power and a greater voice in the
firm’s strategic decisions (Erhemjamts &
Huang, 2019). Larger companies tend to
adopt CSR initiatives upon the insistence
of stakeholders, and economies of scale
can affect the cost of engaging in such
CSR initiatives (Michelon, Boesso, & Kumar, 2013). Studies focusing on firm value
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and return on assets found that the positive relationship between firm value and
CSR is due in part to the lower equity capital costs of higher valued firms (Lee et al.,
2018).

American Electric Power Company and
NRG Energy, Inc. Firms in the information
technology sector include Apple and Intuit
Inc. The consumer discretionary sector includes companies such as Carnival Corporation and O’Reilly Automotive, Inc.

Gaps in the Literature
Much of the CSR/corporate performance
research has linked ESG ratings or CSR
strategies to financial performance or firm
financial valuation (Michelon et al., 2013).
Although studies have linked ESG ratings
to environmental performance (see, e.g.,
Miralles-Quirós et al., 2019), research that
links a firm’s ESG ratings to the level of
regulatory oversight in the firm’s sector is
lacking.
The previous examples of ethical and
compliance lapses also call into question
corporate commitment to operating in a
manner consistent with their ESG ratings.
The current study does not assume that
firms are purposely trying to mislead investors but looks to determine whether
other structural reasons, such as heavy
regulatory oversight, affect the ESG ratings that companies receive.

FINDINGS
This study used ESG rating data from
two independent sources: Sustainalytics,
reported on the website Yahoo Finance,
and MSCI, reported on Fidelity.com. The
data were collected in December 2019.
We conducted two independent statistical analyses: multiple regression analysis
(MRA) using the Sustainalytics data and
multiway frequency analysis (MFA) using
the data from MSCI. The two methodologies are appropriate considering the difference in how the ESG rating firms report
the ESG ratings (the dependent variable).
The data are from four industry sectors.
Two are heavily regulated sectors (Financials and Utilities), and two are less regulated sectors (Information Technology and
Consumer Discretionary). Familiar firms in
the financial sector include Bank of America Corporation and MetLife, Inc. The utilities sector includes companies such as

Study results indicate that the relationship between the level of regulation and
the total ESG rating is not statistically
significant. However, looking at each component of the ESG rating separately, we
find a statistically significant relationship
between the level of regulation and both
the environmental rating of a firm and its
governance rating. The environmental and
governance ratings for firms in heavily
regulated industry sectors are significantly higher than for firms in less regulated
sectors. For the social responsibility rating, we found a statistically significant
but negatively correlated relationship using the data from Sustainalytics, and we
found no statistically significant relationship using the data from MSCI.
Excluding the social component of the
ESG ratings, conclusions regarding the
statistical relationship between ESG ratings and regulation are consistent for the
MRA, which is based on the Sustainalytics
ESG ratings, and the MFA, which uses the
MSCI ratings. Descriptive statistics for the
aggregate ESG rating and the three ESG
component ratings show that the social
rating has the second-highest mean rating using the Sustainalytics data but the
lowest mean rating using the MSCI data.
This difference likely stems from how the
independent rating services score companies or how they weight the components
making up the social performance rating.
The discrepancy in the social rating measure between MSCI and Sustainalytics
points out the need for company leaders
to carefully consider how ESG rating services develop their scores, including their
methodology and data collection practices.
In reviewing the findings related to the mediating variables, our study found a modest statistically significant relationship
between institutional ownership and total
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ESG, but no statistically significant relationship between institutional ownership
and the components of the ESG ratings.
Firm size (i.e., market capitalization) had a
statistically significant relationship to total
ESG and environmental ratings. However,
we found no statistically significant relationship between size and governance,
and only the MRA found a statistically significant relationship between size and social responsibility. Lastly, return on assets
had a significant but slightly negative relationship for the environmental rating only.

LESSONS FOR PRACTICE
The study findings show that environmental and governance ratings for firms
in heavily regulated industry sectors are
significantly higher than for firms in less
regulated sectors. This finding has implications for investors, company executives,
other stakeholders, regulators, and legislators.
Investors rely on ESG ratings for a variety
of reasons, from risk mitigation to determining whether a company is socially
responsible. This study suggests that investors should consider moderating factors that can influence these ratings, such
as whether firms are in a heavily regulated sector. Some ESG rating services (e.g.,
Sustainalytics) report how firms compare
to their peers. This relative rating may be
a more valuable metric than the absolute
rating, given potential moderating factors.
Company executives in heavily regulated
sectors should recognize that their investors and other critical stakeholders expect
their firm to comply with regulatory requirements. If they do not, they may fall
behind their competitors and peers in the
eyes of these stakeholders. For example,
large electric utilities, such as Duke, Dominion, Xcel Energy, and Southern Company have announced plans to hit “net-zero”
carbon emissions by 2050. These industry
leaders set the bar for the rest of the sector, pushing the transformation to more
sustainable ways to produce energy and
publicly promoting energy efficiency. In
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addition, the financial sector damaged its
reputation and received increased scrutiny after the sub-prime mortgage crisis
pushed the nation into a recession, although financials are now experiencing
stellar stock performance. Firms in these
heavily regulated sectors receive higher
environmental and governance ratings
because they are required to comply with
demands of stakeholders and regulators
in these specific areas. Executives of firms
in less regulated sectors might study how
firms in the regulated sectors polished
their tarnished images and emerged with
strong performance in their ESG ratings.

Regulations generally are enacted by
federal and state legislative bodies and
enforced by regulatory commissions or
agencies. This study suggests that regulations make a difference in how companies perform, specifically related to
environmental initiatives. When new
environmental regulations require utility
investment, utility commissions are more
likely to authorize cost recovery. When
unregulated firms make these environmentally friendly investments, they must
fund them from corporate profits, which
may put them at a financial disadvantage
relative to their peers.

Company executives also may recognize
that firms in heavily regulated sectors
have lower social ratings than do firms in
less regulated sectors. Stakeholder theory
would suggest that firms focus on activities reflecting stakeholder priorities. In the
heavily regulated sectors, this focus is on
environmental and governance initiatives.
All companies, highly regulated and less
regulated, have stakeholders that include
employees, customers, and the local and
global communities in which they operate,
pushing them to be socially responsible. In
this regard, the heavily regulated companies are no different than less regulated
companies. These findings correlate with
other ESG studies, which have found that
firms affected by policy uncertainty (e.g.,
firms in regulated industries) have higher
total, environmental, and governance ratings but have a negative record in certain
components of the social score – specifically, the community score (Vural, 2020).
Firms in concentrated, or less competitive
industries tend to reduce their risk-taking
in decision making, and they might use
ESG activities as a risk-reducing strategy. Firms in competitive sectors have
scored lower on environmental and certain governance measures. However, the
components of the social score have not
exhibited differences based on the level
of competition or industry concentration;
instead, the community component was
negatively affected by policy uncertainty
(Vural, 2020).

Stakeholders cannot expect regulated
companies to be any more philanthropic,
worker-oriented, or socially accountable
than any other company; in fact, they may
be less so. However, stakeholders can expect regulated companies to perform better where regulation requires it. Likewise,
when unregulated companies exceed their
competitors’ ESG ratings, they may be doing so out of a true sense of social responsibility.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORY
Institutional investors are seeing a greater demand from their clients to consider
ESG issues. This demand is commensurate with the demographic changes of the
investor class, including the increased
wealth of millennials, women, and previously marginalized groups (Diller et al.,
2021). Stakeholder theory sees the link
between an organization’s success and
the value it brings to its primary stakeholders. Stakeholder theory also establishes a link between an organization’s
credibility and the implicit approval of its
activities from secondary stakeholders,
including government and non-governmental organizations (Maon et al., 2010).
Little research has linked a firm’s total ESG
ratings to the regulatory oversight in the
firm’s industry sector. Some of the findings in this study support earlier studies
in the literature. Michelon et al. (2013)
recognized that each sector was subject
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to pressure from different stakeholder
groups. Specifically, they identified customer groups as having the most influence
on consumer product companies, while
utilities faced significant pressure from
stakeholders who are concerned with the
environmental effects of their operations.
Similarly, Boesso et al. (2015) found that
corporate performance improves in firms
that invest in CSR initiatives that are most
important to their stakeholder needs.
They also determined that firms in environmentally sensitive industries showed
greater improvement in the relationship
between CSR and corporate performance
than did firms in less environmentally sensitive industries.

The findings in this study support those
of Becher and Frye (2011), who state that
“governance is affected by the presence of
regulators, even if they do not directly dictate monitoring levels” (p.738). However,
our findings only partially support earlier
studies that find a relationship between
profitability, or company performance, and
CSR (e.g., Lee et al., 2018).

es. A counter-argument states that large
firms suffer from inertia, so implementing
new programs is harder for them compared to smaller firms (Michelon et al.,
2013).
Future researchers should consider adding regulatory intensity to the list of independent variables as they study corporate
ESG ratings.

The CSR literature identifies firm size as a
mediating variable relating corporate performance and CSR ratings. The investment
in CSR is a relatively small part of a large
firm’s budget. The implication is that large
firms can accommodate stakeholders
without negative financial consequenc-
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technology sector and 90 firms in the consumer discretionary sector. Among the
471 MSCI-rated companies, 201 are highly regulated companies: 64 in the utility
sector and 137 in the financial sector. The
other 270 companies are in the less regulated sectors: 151 in information technology and 119 in consumer discretionary.

billion) were categorized as high market
cap firms or large firms. Firms with $10
billion or less of market capitalization
were moderate market cap firms. The last
mediating variable, total return on assets,
was calculated as net income before taxes divided by total assets, annualized over
three years.

Independent Variable and Mediating
Variables

Dependent Variables

Keywords

APPENDIX ON METHOD
The methodology chosen for this research was quantitative, observational
(non-experimental), and retrospective.
We performed two independent, quantitative assessments: a multiple regression
analysis (MRA) using data from the ESG
rating firm Sustainalytics and a multiway
frequency analysis (MFA) using data from
MSCI. The two methodologies are based
on a difference in how ESG ratings, the dependent variable, are reported by the ESG
rating firms. The MRAs used the numeric
(continuous) ESG ratings from Sustainalytics as the dependent variables (total
ESG, environmental, social, governance
ratings). The MFAs used the categorical
total and component ESG ratings from
MSCI.
The Study Population
The study population consists of 471
publicly traded companies in four industry sectors. Each company has a market
capitalization of at least $3.9 billion and
an MSCI ESG rating. A subset of these
companies (N = 313) has ESG ratings by
Sustainalytics. Among the companies with
Sustainalytics ratings are 140 highly regulated companies: 33 in the utility sector
and 107 in the financial sector. Among the
other 173 companies in the less regulated sectors are 83 firms in the information
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The independent variable is the level of
regulatory oversight. For the MRA, regulatory oversight is a binary value, with “0”
for firms that are not highly regulated (IT
and Consumer Discretionary) and “1” for
firms that are more heavily regulated (Finance and Utilities). For the MFA, these
values were either “highly regulated” or
“not highly regulated” (recognizing that all
publicly traded firms are subject to some
level of regulation).
The mediating variable of institutional ownership is the percentage of each
company’s outstanding stock held by institutional firms. The mediating variable
of market capitalization measures firm
size in dollars. For the MFA, we calculated
the median value of the 471 firms’ market capitalization, and firms with a market
capitalization higher than the median ($10

The dependent variables were the individual ESG component ratings (environmental, social, and governance) and the total
ESG rating of each firm. To operationalize
the variables, we used the ratings from
the two ESG rating firms, Sustainalytics
and MSCI. Sustainalytics (sustainalytics.
com), an independent ESG rating company
based in Amsterdam, uses a numeric rating (0 to 100) for total ESG, environmental,
social and governance ratings. Meanwhile,
MSCI Inc., an American finance company headquartered in New York City, uses
three rating tiers: Leading, Average, and
Laggard.
Statistical Tests
Multiple Regression Analysis. In the MRA,
discrete variables were converted to dichotomous variables using dummy variable coding with 1s and 0s. Assumptions
for linear regression include linear rela-
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tionship, multivariate normality, no or little
multi-collinearity, no autocorrelation, and
homoscedasticity. If data violate these assumptions, the problem may be remedied
using data transformations such as using
the natural logarithm of the raw values.
The regression equation took the
following form:
Yi = A + B1(REGi) + B2(INSTi) +
B3(TOTRETi) + B4(SIZEi),
where Yi is one of the predicted Sustainalytics ESG rating components (environmental, social, or governance) or
the total ESG composite rating.
REGi = 1 for highly regulated firms
and 0 for firms that are not highly
regulated.
INSTi = percent of shares held by
institutional investors as reported by
Fidelity.

To determine whether the sample size being tested provided adequate power, we
conducted a power analysis using G*Power3 Version 3.1.9 software. The sample
size for the study had a power value of
0.95.
Multiway Frequency Analysis. MFA, or an
extension of it called log-linear analysis,
is appropriate when determining the relationships among three or more discrete
(categorical, qualitative) variables. MFA is
an extension of the chi-square for goodness-of-fit technique; it produces a model of expected cell frequencies that best
predicts the observed frequencies, using
a conservative number of variables to do
so. We use the SAS CATMOD procedure for
this study. Table 1 presents a frequency
table for the MFA for the Total ESG rating.
To determine whether the sample size being tested provides adequate power, we
conducted a power analysis using G*Power3 Version 3.1.9 software. The sample
size for the study had a power value of 0.80.

TOTRETi = annualized three-year
return as reported by Fidelity; and
SIZEi = market capitalization (or natural log of market capitalization).

Table 1: Data for Four Industry Sectors vs. Overall MSCI Rating

Regulation
High

Not High

Grand Total

28

Size
Large
Mid
Total
Large
Mid
Total

Overall MSCI Rating
Laggard
Average
Leader
14
69
17
27
70
4
41
139
21
19
90
26
25
95
15
44
185
41
85
324
62
18%
69%
13%

Engaged Management ReView

Total
100
101
201
135
135
270
471

43%

57%
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Data Description and Screening. For our initial selection of firms, we used the Fidelity.com Stock Screener tool, which allowed us to select
firms from specific market sectors screened for firm size. Table 2 displays the number of firms by subsector that have Sustainalytics and
MSCI ratings.
Table 2: Firms Rated by Sustainalytics and MSCI, by Sector and Sub-sector
UNREGULATED (N = 307)

REGULATED (N = 223)

Firms w/Sustainalytics* Rating: 173, w/MSCI** Rating: 270, w/o Ratings: 38
No. of Firms Rated By:
Sustainalytics
MSCI
Consumer Discretionary (N = 127)
83
119

Firms w/Sustainalytics* Rating: 140, w/MSCI** Rating: 201, w/o Ratings: 21
No. of Firms Rated By:
Sustainalytics
MSCI
Utilities (N = 69)
33
64

Hotels, Restaurants & Leisure

18

28

Electric Utilities

16

25

Specialty Retail
Household Durables

16
10

24
12

Multi-Utilities
Gas Utilities

11
2

16
10

Textiles, Apparel & Luxury Goods
Automobiles
Multiline Retail
Auto Components

10
7
6
6

15
5
7
6

Ind. Power and Renewable Elec. Producers
Water Utilities
Financials (N = 154)
Insurance

2
2
107
36

7
6
137
45

Internet & Direct Marketing Retail

4

8

Banks

31

48

Leisure Products
Distributors
Diversified Consumer Services

3
2
1

5
3
6

Capital Markets
Consumer Finance
Diversified Financial Services

29
5
3

29
7
3

Information Technologies (N = 180)
IT Services
Software

90
26
21

151
37
45

Thrifts & Mortgage Finance

3

5

Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equip.
Electr. Equip., Instruments & Components

19
9

30
19

Tech Hardware, Storage & Peripherals
Communications Equipment

9
6

10
10

*Sustainalytics ratings were found on Yahoo Finance
**MSCI ratings were found on Fidelity.com

For the MFA, the dependent variables were the MSCI ESG ratings, as summarized in Table 3. We calculated the means and the standard
deviations by assigning numerical values to the ESG ratings: Laggard = 1, Average = 2, and Leader = 3. For the population, the lowest scores
were fora the social category (MSCIsoc, M = 1.77), and the highest scores were for the governance category (MSCIgov, M = 2.26).
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics, Multiway Frequency Analysis
Categorized as:

MSCI Variables (n = 471)
Variable

SAS Descriptor

Total ESG Rating

TotMSCI

1.95

Environmental Rating

MSCIenv

Social Rating
Governance Rating

Regulation

regnoreg

Mean

Laggard

Average

0.56

85

324

62

2.00

0.67

105

263

103

MSCIsoc

1.77

0.51

90

364

17

MSCIgov

2.26

0.50

9

360

102

Non Reg

Reg

Mean

Market Capitalization

29

SD

Size

Engaged Management ReView

0.43
1.50

SD
0.50
0.50

270

201

Medium

Large

236

235

Leader
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Testing Assumptions and Descriptive Statistics – Multiple Regression Analysis. The variables were evaluated to determine whether there was
any violation of the assumptions used in conducting a regression analysis, including assumptions of multi-collinearity, presence of outliers, normality, homoscedasticity, and independence of residuals. Where required, we transformed the variables and identified and eliminated outliers. The resulting descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis (N = 285) are presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics - Multiple Regression
Variable

SAS Descriptor

Mean

Median

SD

Kurtosis

Skewness

Min

Max

Total ESG Rating

SustTot

59.38

58.00

9.60

(0.59)

0.43

43.00

87.00

Environmental Rating

SustEnv

56.91

55.00

15.04

(0.66)

0.35

31.00

96.00

Social Rating

SustSoc

60.08

59.00

10.28

(0.38)

0.30

38.00

89.00

Governance Rating

SustGov

62.47

62.00

9.00

(0.65)

0.04

41.00

87.00

Total Annualized 3 Year Return

TotRet3yr

13.75

13.77

11.78

(0.17)

0.21

(12.22)

46.32

Institutional Ownership

InsOwnSR

4.20

4.12

1.54

(0.20)

0.27

0.32

8.02

LOGMKTCAP

1.32

1.27

0.40

(0.41)

0.48

0.60

2.40

Market Capitalization

In addition to the continuous variables, the categorical variable for regulation (M = .45) had 129 of the 285 firms coded as “1” (Regulated).
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